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COMMENTS
MANDATORY PUBLICATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS PRIOR TO
ISSUANCE OF PATENTS: A DESIRABLE CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY?
I. INTRODUCTION
Under current U.S. law, the Patent and Trademark Office
keeps a patent application in confidence.' In 1952, Congress, in
enacting 35 U.S.C. § 122, codified the rule of secrecy of patent
applications, which had existed in the Patent Office for
generations.2  This veil of secrecy exists until the Patent Office
grants a patent.3 Congress, however, presently is considering
abandoning this practice in favor of a system that mandates
publication of each patent application eighteen months after the
first filing date.4 The United States is the only major country in
the world that does not publish pending patent applications within
eighteen months of the first filing date.5
The United States originally sought to change 35 U.S.C. § 122
as part of the effort to harmonize world intellectual property
laws.6 In 1994, after the United States signed a bilateral accord
1. Current U.S. patent law provides that:
Applications for patents shall be kept in confidence by the Patent and Trademark
Office and no information conceining the same given without authority of the
applicant or owner unless necessary to carry out the provisions of any Act of
Congress or in such special circumstances as may be determined by the
Commissioner.
35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994).
2. Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952) and S. REP. No. 1979,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)).
3. Id.
4. The eighteen-month "clock" would start with the earliest filing date and is not
reset by filing a subsequent continuation to the original application. See H.R. 1733, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
5. Patent System Harmonization Legislation is Debated in Joint Senate-House Hearing,
44 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.(BNA) No. 1080, at 3 (May 7, 1992).
6. One motive the United States had in seeking to harmonize patent protection is to
eliminate trade distortions caused by lack of adequate protection of intellectual property
rights abroad. Japanese Patent Policy: Hearing Before the SubcomVnittee on Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1989) [hereinafter Japanese Patent Policy Hearing] (statement of
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with Japan, Congress proposed,7 but did not enact, eighteen-
month mandatory publication.' In the bilateral agreement, the.
United States agreed to begin eighteen-month publication by
.January 1, 1996. 9  The current proposal for eighteen-month
mandatory publication is in H.R. 1733.10 The U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office has proposed changes to the Rules of Practice
in Patent Cases to implement the eighteen-month publication of
patent applications pursuant to H.R. 1733."
Part II of this Comment addresses the rationale behind
confidential applications by examining policy concerns. Part III
examines the arguments in opposition to and in support of
mandatory publication. Finally, Part IV concludes that the United
States should not implement eighteen-month mandatory disclosure
and suggests instead that the United States provide translations of
published foreign applications to inventors. This approach would
avoid mandatory publication of inventions belonging to exclusively
domestic filers while allowing all U.S. inventors access to interna-
tionally filed applications after eighteen months.
II. POLICY BEHIND THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF CONFIDENTIAL
APPLICATIONS
The U.S. patent system provides patentees with protection
within the United States. 2 Growth of global markets has led
many companies to sell their products abroad. Some legislators
Michael K. Kirk, Assistant Commissioner for External Affairs, Patent and Trademark
Office). See also 136 CONG. REc.' E3497 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Kolbe) (stating that piracy of U.S. business's intellectual property added up to between $43
and $61 billion dollars a year--or 30 to 50% of our trade deficit). See generally Jobs
Through Anti-Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Economic Policy, Trade and
Environment of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Jobs Through Anti-Piracy]. Improving intellectual property
protection abroad will help U.S. companies compete abroad and thereby improve the trade
deficit. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra, at 2 (statement of Sen. Burns).
7. S. 2488, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
8. See Teresa Riordan, U.S., Japan In Accord On Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1994,
at D1.
9. Proposed Rules on 18-Month Publication of Applications are Issued, 50 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1241, at 415 (Aug. 17, 1995) [hereinafter Rules
Issued].
10. H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
11. 60 Fed. Reg. 42,352 (1995) [hereinafter Proposed Rules] (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 5) (proposed Aug. 15, 1995).
12. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 4 (3d ed. 1994).
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are urging a change in the U.S. patent system in an effort to gain
greater patent protection for U.S. inventors abroad. 3 Although
the United States should diligently seek greater patent protection
abroad, it should not abandon underlying policy concerns and
compromise its patent system.
The Constitution grants Congress the power "[tjo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries .... "" This clause confers, power to
Congress for the purpose of promoting progress. 5 To this end,
the patent clause allows a "balance between the need to encourage
innovation and the avoidance of monopolies which stifle com-
petition without any concomitant advance in the 'Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' .16 The government grants a monopoly
as consideration for disclosure 7 and to induce 8 creative effort."t
13. See 138 CONG. REC. E1041 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1992) (statement of Rep. Hughes);
see also The Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992 (S. 2605 and H.R. 4978): Joint
Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1992)
[hereinafter Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearing] (statement of Hon. Harry
F. Manbeck, Jr., Commissioner, Patent and Trademark Office).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Ellsworth H. Mosher, W(h)ither Away the U.S. Patent Office?, 74 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 335, 336 (1992) (arguing clause 8 is a limited grant of power as
compared to other clauses).
16. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
17. This is referred to as an "exchange-for-secret." See Fritz Machlup, An Economic
Review of the Patent System, Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Study No. 15, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 21
(1958). "[Inventions] would be kept secret and . .. society can obtain the substantial
benefit of disclosure only by offering patent protection in exchange for publication." Id.
at 24.
18. This is referred to as the "monopoly-profit-incentive." Id. at 21. According to this
theory,
[t]he profit expectations connected with the hope for a patent monopoly may
induce inventive talents to exert their efforts, and venturous capitalists to risk
their money,-in research, experimentation, development, and pioneer plants; in
order to be effective, the hoped-for gains from the hoped-for monopoly may have
to be a multiple of the expenses incurred since few would want to risk the loss
of their entire stakes unless they had a good chance of getting back much more
than they put up ....
Id. at 23-24. "The thesis that the patent system may produce effective profit incentives for
inventive activity and thereby promote progress in the technical arts is widely accepted."
Id. at 33. One noted English inventor remarked in 1850, "[t]here is not a working boy of
average ability in the New England States ... who has not an idea of some mechanical
invention or improvement ... by which he hopes to better his position, or rise to fortune."
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The underlying philosophy of the U.S. system is that the best
way to promote invention is to protect the property rights of the
inventor, thereby creating the economic incentive to invent.2°
The U.S. system creates a contract, according to which an inventor
discloses his invention if the government gives substantive rights
in the form of a patent.2 ' This system has the benefit of
providing an incentive to design around patented inventions, which
results in the creation of new innovations.22 The United States
designed the patent monopoly as "a reward, an inducement, to
bring forth new knowledge.,
23
III. THE DEBATE OVER EIGHTEEN-MONTH MANDATORY
PUBLICATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS
A. Arguments Against Eighteen-Month Mandatory Publication
There are several arguments against mandatory disclosure
eighteen months after filing.24 Critics argue that eighteen-month
mandatory disclosure would: (1) discourage use of the patent
system due to inadequate trade secret protection;25 (2) benefit big
AARON E. KLEIN & CYNTHIA L. KLEIN, THE BETTER MOUSE TRAP: A MISCELLANY OF
GADGETS, LABOR-SAVING DEVICES, AND INVENTIONS THAT INTRIGUE 27 (Beaufort
Books 1982).
19. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp.,
289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933)).
20. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on
Finance of the Senate, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1993) [hereinafter International Trade
Hearing] (statement of Dr. Allen I. Mendelowitz).
21. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 48 (statement of A. E. Hirsch, Jr.,
Pacific Industrial Property Association).
22. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 828 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
23. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966).
24. Some have stated that eighteen-month mandatory publication would be costly to
the U.S. Patent Office. Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearing, supra note 13,
at 57 (statement by Rep. DeConcini imputing statement to Harry F. Manbeck, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks). The focus of this
Comment is on how best to stimulate new inventions. Increased cost may be justifiable
if sufficient new innovation and economic growth results. That analysis is beyond the
scope of this Comment.
25. "Unlike the patent law harmonization law proposed in 1992, the current proposed
language on 18-month publication does not provide for accelerated examination of
applications or first office actions within 18 months of filing." Bill Proposes 20-Year Patent
Term and 18-Month Publication of Applications, 47 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
No. 1167, at 354 (Feb. 17, 1994).
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industry26 at the expense of small inventors;27 and (3) implicitly
change the philosophy of the patent policy.
1. Inadequate Trade Secret Protection
Under current U.S. law, "[p]ublication does not occur until the
patent is actually granted."28  The U.S. Patent Office holds
pending or abandoned29 applications in secrecy.3 The primary
purpose of maintaining secrecy is to protect the applicant's trade
secret should the Patent Office not grant a patent.3 According
to the Restatement of Torts, "[a] trade secret may consist of any
formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use
it."'32 An inventor is faced with a choice of receiving a patent or
maintaining a trade secret. As a trade secret, an inventor can
"keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely.
33
Critics of eighteen-month publication contend "[inventors] will
have to disclose their secrets to competitors without any assurance
that they will ultimately be granted a patent."34  Additionally,
"[m]any inventors are concerned that publication of their patent
applications will jeopardize their trade secret protection on
inventions that turn out not to be patentable., 35  Under an
eighteen-month mandatory publication system, inventors who
might otherwise use the patent system might now favor trade
26. "Multinational corporations filing applications around the world have a greater
self-interest in harmonization than the small entity or individual applicants ...." First to
File and Inequitable Conduct Dominate ABA-PTC Meeting in Atlanta, Pat., Trademark &
Copyright L. Daily (BNA), Sept. 9, 1991, available in LEXIS, Patent Library, BNAPTD
File [hereinafter First to File].
27. Independent inventors argue they will be hurt by an eighteen-month publication
rule. Riordan, supra note 8, at D1.
28. 140 CONG. REC. S13,863 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1994) (statement of Rep. DeConcini).
29. Sears v. Gottschalk, 502 F.2d 122 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976)
(holding that abandoned applications are entitled to secrecy).
30. 35 U.S.C. § 122 (1994).
31. Samson Helfgott, Cultural Differences Between the U.S. and Japanese Patent
Systems, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 231, 232-33 (1990).
32. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
33. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (quoting United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186-87 (1933)).
34. Riordan, supra note 8, at Dl.
35. 138 CONG. REC. E1041 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1992) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
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secret protection rather than risk the possible disclosure of a trade
secret through the application process.36
Mandatory publication could fail to adequately protect trade
secrets to varying degrees. If the Patent Office ultimately decides
not to grant a patent after the application has been pending longer
than eighteen months, an applicant has lost the trade secret and
has not gained the protection of the patent system in return.
Although other countries may not protect trade secrets, 37 the
United States considers trade secrets valuable and seeks greater
international recognition of this form of intellectual property.
38
Loss of a trade secret with nothing in return would be neither an
attractive exchange nor an effective inducement.39 Under the
current proposed legislation, an applicant could avoid this harsh
result and retain the invention as a trade secret by choosing to
abandon4" his application before publication.41 Therefore, if an
inventor's application is still pending as it approaches the eighteen-
month mark, the inventor must make a difficult choice. He can
either remain an applicant in hopes of potentially receiving a
patent, or withdraw the application to ensure maintenance of a
trade secret.
36. Proponents of eighteen-month publication argue that few applicants would be able
to effectively utilize trade secret protection in lieu of patent protection. Although this may
be true, a trade secret property right, however transient, exists in every invention. See
HARMON, supra note 12, at 3. A trade secret may be valuable to an inventor even if it
cannot extend to the length of a patent. The arguments presented in this section assume
that trade secrets have a value to an inventor and that the loss of a trade secret is a loss
of property.
37. In 1990, Japan enacted a law protecting trade secrets. Jobs Through Anti-Piracy,
supra note 6, at 58 (prepared statement of Ira S. Shapiro, General Counsel to the U.S.
Trade Representative). Prior to that, although "[tihe Japanese... [did] have trade secret
protection available on a contractual basis ... [they did] not, to our knowledge, have any
effective protection against third parties who wrongfully acquire or use trade secrets."
Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 15 (statement of Michael K. Kirk,
Assistant Commissioner for External Affairs, Patent and Trademark Office).
38. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 15.
39. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
40. "[A]n application that is no longer pending shall not be published .... " H.R.
1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
41. Eighteen-month mandatory publication as proposed in H.R. 1733 provides that an
independent inventor's application, upon filing a request and fee, would not be published
until three months after the first office action by the PTO, even if that occurs later than
eighteen months after filing. Rules Issued, supra note 9. Ninety-two percent of applicants
already receive a first office action within fourteen months. Patents, Patent Office Holds
Hearing on Rules for 18-Month Publication of Applications, Daily Rep. for Executives
(BNA), at A182 (Sept. 20, 1995) [hereinafter Patents, Patent Office].
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If the applicant chooses not to withdraw and the Patent Office
ultimately grants a patent some time after eighteen months, the
inventor temporarily loses his trade secret. The temporary loss of
a trade secret can lead to improper third-party exploitation and
loss of a competitive advantage. Current U.S. patent law protects
an inventor from third-party exploitation of his invention by
maintaining confidentiality. To allay concerns about third-party
exploitation, H.R. 1733 provides a reasonable royalty provision.
A reasonable royalty allows patentees to recover for use of their
patented inventions during the pre-grant period subsequent to
publication.42 This provision is open to severe criticism, however,
because it requires actual notice or knowledge of the published
patent application 3 and that the "invention claimed in the patent
... [be] identical to the invention as claimed in the published
patent application."" Because the entire process of patent
examination requires sculpting and molding of patent claims, this
situation almost never occurs.45
If the secret is out and the Patent Office has not yet granted
the patent, the applicant loses a competitive advantage. Because
the applicant does not know what will be the ultimate scope of the
patent, he may not be able to proceed. This uncertainty causes, in
part, a loss of advantage.46  Pending applications are not as
valuable as patents. 47  Venture capitalists are unlikely to give
money on rights which may never mature.4 Uncertainty as to
the scope of a patent also weakens a prospective patentee's
negotiating position during licensing.49 In the interim, the inven-
tion is public. Now aware of the invention, competitors are free
to begin designing around it. Competitors are able to compete
42. H.R. 1733, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1995).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Hearing of the Courts and Intellectual Property Subcommittee of the House
Judiciary Committee, Fed. Info. Sys., Nov. 3, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (statement of Robert Rines, Franklin Pierce Law Center) [hereinafter
Intellectual Prop. Subcommittee Hearing].
46. See Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 70 (statement of A.E. Hirsch,
Jr., Pacific Industrial Property Association).
47. Intellectual Prop. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45.
48. See id.
49. See Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 70 (statement of A.E. Hirsch,
Jr., Pacific Industrial Property Association).
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more effectively than they would absent the Patent Office's
disclosure of the inventor's idea.
Competitors are more likely than ever to be able to exploit
this information. The ease of retrieving information in today's
society is unprecedented. In today's world, mandatory publication
is virtually certain to put this information in the hands of com-
petitors. Currently, full text and drawings of published patents are
available on the Internet. ° Under rules that the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office has proposed, "[tlhe current planning approach
to the implementation of early publication is to create an
electronic data base which captures the technical content, i.e., the
specification, abstract, claims and drawings, of the application-as-
filed .... This electronic data base will be used to provide ...
electronic searching and retrieval of applications ....""
The loss of a ,competitive edge due to eighteen-month
mandatory publication, along with the possibility of receiving
nothing in return for the disclosure of an invention, is a less
attractive exchange5 2 and discourages disclosure.53  Mandatory
publication, instead, would erode the purpose of a patent law by
inadequately protecting the property rights of inventors. As the
courts have noted, "the filing of an application for a patent is [not]
the dedication of a secret to the public . . . . If the secret is
valuable, the discoverer, conceiving it to be patentable, would by
making application hazard both secret and patent. This would
defeat the very purpose of the patent law ....
2. Gains for Large Corporations at the Expense of Small
Entities
Independent inventors and small companies fear a system that
gives benefits to big industry at, their expense.55 "A [patent]
system clearly favors major companies that have established
marketing strength whenever [it] ... negates an advantage for the
50. Sabra Chartrand, Going On-Line Speeds Patent Searches, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Aug. 15, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File. Full text and drawings
are available on the World Wide Web at site http://www.micropat.com. Id.
51. Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 42,352.
52. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
53. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
54. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Petroleum Iron Works Co., 73 F.2d 531, 536 (6th Cir. 1934).
55. First to File, supra note 26.
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patentee. 5 6  Increased protection abroad at the expense of
weakening domestic protection would not further long range U.S.
competitiveness. Independent inventors and small companies also
fear the loss of a needed competitive advantage. In addition,
eighteen-month mandatory publication could discourage filing and
potentially serve as a tool to slow patent prosecution.
One of the arguments for changing the patent system has been
the need to compete in a global economy.58 Achieving stronger
patent protection abroad will help increase U.S. exports,59 most
of which large companies produce.' Hence, larger, multinational
corporations stand to receive the greatest benefit from worldwide
patent protection.61 While stronger patent protection abroad62
is something the United States should diligently seek, gaining such
protection should not be at the expense of independent inventors
and small companies. Small and medium size businesses produce
seventy-five percent of the U.S. gross national product.63
Furthermore, "less than 30% of... United States based industrial
capacity [from large companies] goes into foreign trade."'
According to these statistics, perceived gains by large U.S.
multinational corporations can not justify changing patent
procedure if achieving these gains is at a significant expense to
domestic industry.
In addition, "it is well-recognized that the American com-
petitive edge is technology and the Japanese competitive edge is
production., 65 Thus, even if U.S. patent laws provide early access
56. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 78 (statement of George B.
Rathmann, Chairman, Amgen Corporation).
57. Patent prosecution is a term of art used to describe the application process.
58. Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearing, supra note 13, at 152 (statement
of Douglas W. Wyatt).
59. See generally Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 2.
60. Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearing, supra note 13, at 152 (statement
of Douglas W. Wyatt).
61. First to File, supra note 26.
62. See infra part III.B.3.
63. Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearing, supra note 13, at 152 (statement
of Douglas W. Wyatt).
64. Id.
65. Testimony June 08, 1995 Raymond Damadian, M.D. President and Chairman Fonar
Corporation House Judiciary Courts and Intellectual Property Patents-Legislation, Fed. Doc.
Clearing House (June 8, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
[hereinafter.Damadian Testimony].
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to new technology,66 actual gains by U.S. multinational cor-
porations could be less than the perceived gains. Benefits to large
companies, at the expense of independent inventors and small
companies, arguably would not increase the long range com-
petitiveness of the United States.
Independent inventors and small companies also fear that a
loss of competitive advantage, resulting from publication prior to
issuance, will allow larger corporations with more capital to move
more quickly into the field.67 Allowing others to rapidly develop
applications that the published application suggests could be
calamitous for the independent inventor.' Domestic and foreign
corporations alike could begin developing products in areas
previously known only to the inventor and the Patent Office until
the Patent Office issues the patent.69
Critics oppose early publication because large corporations
could exploit the process to slow patent prosecution. Some believe
that large companies could file overly broad claims in order to
create phony prior art as a means to discourage small inventors
from pursuing their own patent applications.7"
In addition, some critics have suggested that third parties
could use prior art to delay prosecution.7 Under Rule 56, an
applicant has an ongoing duty of candor that requires disclosure of
prior art to the examiner while the application is pending.72 If an
applicant does not disclose prior art, the Patent Office could find
the applicant to have engaged in inequitable conduct.73 After
learning of the content of an application, a third party could flood
66. For a discussion of the benefits of earlier access to new technology, see infra part
III.B.l.a.
67. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
68. Testimony November 01, 1995 David Hill, President Patent Enforcement Fund, Inc.
House Judiciary Courts and Intellectual Property Patents-Legislation, Fed. Doc. Clearing
House (Nov. 1, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Hill
Testimony].
69. Id.
70. Patents, Patent Office, supra note 41.
71. PTO Holds Public Hearing on 18-Month Publication of Patent Applications, 49
'Pat., Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1217, at 492 (Feb. 23, 1995) [hereinafter PTO
Holds Hearing].
72. "Each individual associated with the filing an prosecution of a patent application
has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office, which includes a duty to
disclose to the Office all information known to that individual to be material to paten-
tability ...." Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1995).
73. PTO Holds Hearing, supra note 71.
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the applicant with prior art. If the applicant does not disclose that
art to the Patent Office, the Patent Office could later invalidate a
patent. Disclosure of the irrelevant prior art delays the examiner.
Also,' it could ultimately force the applicant to overcome objections
based on irrelevant prior art. This would delay prosecution and
increase the cost of the application.
3. Implicit Change in Patent Policy
The essential purpose of a patent in the United States is to
protect the inventor.74 Other countries "do not consider the
rights of the individual the way we do in [the] United States of
America." As a result, "most of the innovation happens in the
United States of America., 75 Some now believe that the right of
the public to information outweighs the right of an inventor to
keep their information confidential until the U.S. government
grants a patent.76 But, focusing on the inventor does benefit the
public. As one U.S.Senator noted, "[t]here never was a true
invention from which the public did not reap infinitely greater
pecuniary reward than the inventor.,
77
In comparison, different fundamental policy considerations
guide Japan in its approach to promoting economic development.
Japan's philosophy is to promote economic development through
a maximum diffusion of technology.78 Mandatory publication of
an application for all to see is a natural result of this type of
policy. Focusing on maximum diffusion as a means to promote
economic development, rather than the protection of property
rights, favors mandatory eighteen-month publication over publica-
tion after securing a property right. Some claim that this policy is
a result of the "strong relationship between the government and
the major corporate entities . . . [causing] that patent system...
74. Helfgott, supra note 31, at 232.
75. Intellectual Prop. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45, at 17 (statement of Rep.
Rohrabacher).
76. See Testimony June 08, 1995 Andrew Kimbrell Executive Director International
Center for Technology Assessment House Judiciary Courts and Intellectual Property Patents-
Legislation, Fed. Doc. Clearing House (June 8, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File (statement of Andrew Kimbrell, Executive Director International Center
for Technology Assessment).
77. Intellectual Prop. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45 (Raymond Damadian,
inventor of Magnetic Resonance Imaging, quoting an 1891 statement of Sen. O.H. Platt).
78. International Trade Hearing, supra note 20, at 34.
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[to be] entirely dominated by the viewpoint that they
represent."79 Conforming the U.S. patent system would implicitly
adopt the maximum diffusion model to replace the property rights
model.'
B. Arguments in Support of Mandatory Publication
Arguments supporting eighteen-month mandatory publication
include: (1) providing earlier access to new inventions; (2) giving
U.S. inventors access to information that, although secret in the
United States, is public information in foreign countries; (3) using
such publication as a bargaining chip to attain more meaningful
protection of patents in other countries; (4) establishing conformity
with the rest of the world; and (5) having limited impact on U.S.
applicants.
1. Earlier Access to New Inventions
a. Stimulation of New Ideas
Proponents of mandatory publication believe that earlier
disclosure of all inventions would provide U.S. inventors with
leading technology81 and would enable them to save resources.
8 2
Mandatory disclosure would save resources by preventing
duplication of research and signaling promising areas of
research.3  Some commentators argue that providing U.S.
inventors with leading technology through early disclosure would
enhance U.S. industrial development.'s  They believe that
eighteen-month publication is the proper balance between the
needs of the inventor and the desire for rapid dissemination of
information. These commentators base this conclusion on the
79. Intellectual Prop. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Dr. David
L. Hill, President, Patent Enforcement Fund, Incorporated).
80. Though this model is successful in countries such as Japan, it may not be sufficient
to achieve the underlying goals and purposes of U.S. patent laws. For a discussion
comparing the results Of the different policies, see infra notes 90-94 and accompanying
text.
81. 140 CONG. REC. S13,863 (daily ed. Sept. 30,1994) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. "[L]aying open patent applications helps domestic industry." Paul A. Ragusa,
Eighteen Months to Publication: Should the United States Join Europe and Japan by
Promptly Publishing Patent Applications?, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 143, 162
(1992).
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overwhelming use of eighteen-month publication in other
countries. They believe that the United States should adopt the
eighteen-month mandatory publication system because, in other
countries, it neither punishes inventors nor perceivably dilutes the
incentive value of a patent."
One of the purposes of the U.S. patent system is to encourage
dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inven-
tions86 in order to stimulate further creative ideas.87 To be sure,
new ideas stimulate others to invent; however, early disclosure is
not the only means to stimulate innovation and encourage
industrial development. As one court noted, "the obligation to
disclose is not the principal reason for a patent system .... The
reason for the patent system is to encourage innovation and its
fruits . . . . ' It would be erroneous to state that early public
disclosure is the "linchpin" of the patent system.
89
Focusing solely on the stimulation of ideas as the purpose
behind the patent system would lead to the conclusion that
publishing patent applications immediately after the Patent Office
receives the application would achieve maximum industrial
development.' Immediate publication undoubtedly would cause
prospective patentees to consider what they stand to receive as
consideration for revealing their secret to the public. Similarly,
mandatory publication at eighteen months would reduce a
patentee's prospects of reaping the fruits of innovation, and would
have a negative effect on the decision to seek patent protection.
Protecting the economic expectations that accompany property
rights creates the economic incentive to invent.
Although focusing on early disclosure has provided successful
means of producing economic prosperity in other countries, it may
not necessarily produce the same result domestically. This is due
85. Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearing, supra note 13, at 67 (statement
of Robert F. Merges, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law). The
"needs of the inventor[] include[] the availability of a reasonable time after filing to assess
the prospects for patentability and perfect the details of the invention." Id.
86. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 532 (1966).
87. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 61 (statement of Pacific Industrial
Property Association).
88. Paulik v. Ritzkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
89. See id. at 1282 (describing the public policy inherent in 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)).
90. The only support that earlier publication of ideas might hasten technological
advance is by analogy to basic research. Pure scientists are urged to publish as early as
possible. Machlup, supra note 17, at 25.
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to different policy concerns91 and differences in economic
needs.92 Japan's economy relies heavily on export, whereas the
United States relies heavily on its internal market.93 This has led
to marked differences in the type of inventions produced.
In the past fifty-five years, U.S. citizens have won over fifty
percent of the awards and Nobel prizes in science and engineering,
medicine, and microbiology. Japanese citizens have not won
any.94 The commissioner of Japan's Patent Office underscored
these differences in the type of inventions produced on a recent
visit to the United States. He stated that "most of their work is a
result of improvement patents building on technologies invented
in the United St[ates] . . . ."9' So, despite its success abroad,
mandatory publication may not produce identical results because
of these underlying fundamental policy differences.
b. Submarine Patents
Yet another complaint stemming from the unavailability of
early access to applications is that it allows "submarine patents" to
emerge and disrupt entire industries.9 6 A submarine patent is a
patent that is granted, or "emerges," after a long pendency period
in the U.S. Patent Office, during which time others may have
unknowingly infringed on the patent.97 Under existing law,
patent examiners cannot consider an earlier-filed patent ap-
plication when determining the patentability of a later-filed
application." Examiners can only consider an earlier-filed
application after the patent is issuance.9 Issuance of a patent can
take from one year to more than a decade."° If the grant covers
a previously granted but later-filed application, a submarine patent
91. See supra note 78-79 and accompanying text.
92. Damadian Testimony, supra note 65.
93. Id.
94. Intellectual Prop. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of James
Chandler, President, National Intellectual Property Law Institute).
95. Id.
96. Ragusa, supra note 84, at 164 (citing Final Report of Committee 108, 1991 A.B.A.
SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. 5).
97. Recent Developments in the Legislature: Hearing Held on Patent Term Reform Bill,
5 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 23 (May 1994) [hereinafter Recent Developments].
98. Patent System Harmonization Act of 1992 Hearing, supra note 13, at 103 (statement
of Robert B. Benson, Past President, American International Property Law Association).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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has emerged. The submarine patent then challenges the validity
of the previously granted, later-filed application.
The threat of submarine patents causes uncertainty in the
marketplace. Publication at eighteen months would provide
certainty as to patentability determinations that the Patent Office
makes.' Arguably, "[u]nder existing law, inventors sometimes
commit substantial resources to development of an invention based
on an incomplete, erroneous assessment of patentability of the
applications they file."'0 2 Reducing the possibility of submarine
patents would be a benefit to these inventors. Eighteen-month
mandatory publication is an effort to address the problem of
submarine patents.0 3
Submarine patents can occur in several ways. One way is
when an applicant prolongs the period of pendency by filing a
continuing application under 35 U.S.C. § 120. A continuing
application provides a mechanism for the patent applicant to more
accurately or. correctly claim the invention that an earlier ap-
plication disclosed while still retaining the benefit of his original
filing date."'O Some suggest that patent applicants may use this
mechanism. intentionally to delay the patent grant to gain an
advantage in the marketplace.0 5 Possible improper motives for
delaying patent prosecution include delaying publication, shifting
the patent term forward in time, and prolonging the effective
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. Recent Developments, supra note 97.
104. IRVING KAYTON, 2 PATENT PRACTICE 6-1 (PRI 1993). Commentators note that
patent applications on breakthrough inventions often are filed with an incomplete
understanding of the significance of the invention. The patent office does a search of the
prior art and, in light of the search, invariably rejects the application. The applicant is
given a chance to speak with the examiner and to amend the application. If the applicant
is unable to amend it satisfactorily, there is a final rejection. The applicant then can:
respond to the final rejection by placing the application in a condition for allowance in
accordance with the examiner's suggestions (not as a matter of right); appeal the
examiner's decision to the board of appeals; decide not to seek patent protection; or file
a continuation. A continuation application gives the applicant another opportunity to
present claims to the same invention and to have dialog with an examiner. With
breakthrough inventions, three or four continuation applications are sometimes needed.
See Intellectual Prop. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45, at 50 (statement of Robert
Rines, Franklin Pierce Law Center). For a more detailed description of the U.S. Patent
Office examining procedure, see U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PAT.
EXAMINING PROC. (5th ed. rev. 15, 1993).
105. See Samuel C. Miller III, Undue Delay in the Prosecution of Patent Applications,
74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF: SoC'Y 729, 733 (1992).
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period of exclusivity."° Others also allege that applicants inten-
tionally "delay decisions so that the patent can surface years later
in infringement claims against the unwary."'"°  Though these
allegations exist, "the data show this practice to be rare."'l
During a GAIT fast-track hearing last summer, U.S.
Patent Commissioner Bruce Lehman warned of submarines,
testifying that between 1971 and 1993 there were 627 cases in
which patent pendency exceeded 20 years, with one taking 36
years.
According to former U.S. Patent Commissioner Donald
Banner, 257 of those patents were owned by the U.S.
government and kept secret for security reasons, and 75 private
patents were also subject to secrecy orders, including [the] one
... that took 36 years. "Even assuming 300 subs in those 23
years," says Banner, "that's one for every 7,700, or 13/1,000s of
1 percent." Probably an even smaller number remained
commercially significant, with few, if any, the result of
deliberate manipulation by applicants.' °9
Due to their rarity, patent officials could deal with commer-
cially significant, improperly motivated submarine patents could be
dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Although of questionable
effectiveness, principles of laches, forfeiture, or inequitable conduct
could provide avenues of redress for particularly egregious
cases.11°
Improperly motivated submarine patents may become even
less significant in the future, without the need for eighteen-month
mandatory publication, due to recent revisions in U.S. patent
laws."' As a result of GATT negotiations, patent protection
now commences after the patent grant, and lasts for twenty years
106. Id. at 732-33.
107. Donald W. Banner & Skip Kaltenheuser, Don't Sneak Changes Into GATT, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, § 3, at 9, reprinted in 140 CONG. REc. E2206 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1994).
108. Id. '
109. Robert H. Rines & Skip Kaltenheuser, Patent Legislation Pending, CONN. L. TRIB.,
July 3, 1995, at 21.
110. See Miller, supra note 105, at 737-49 (citing the difficulty of proof and the courts'
reluctance to find invalidity or unenforceability when the applicant is using accepted
practice or procedural mechanisms that are legal). The author suggests that shifting the
burden of proceeding to the patentee after some defined period, to show that the delays
the patentee caused were reasonable, would help meet the burden of showing improper
intent by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 746.
111. Id. at 749 (stating that fixing the term from the priority date could prove an
effective solution to intentionally delayed patents).
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from the filing date of the original application."2  This is true
whether or not there is a continuing application. This recent
change in patent law removes any incentive to delay the granting
of the patent. Applicants can neither shift the patent forward in
time nor prolong the effective exclusivity of the patent. Because
applicants can no longer achieve these objectives, the amount of
improperly motivated submarine patents should decrease to
virtually nothing.
As an alternative to mandatory publication at eighteen
months, Congress has introduced a bill to address submarine
patents. 1 3  It provides for automatic publication of patent ap-
plications where continuing applications claim the benefit of a
filing date of a prior application filed more than five years
earlier."4 Publication five years after the filing date would limit
112. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 532, 108 Stat. 4809
(1994). Congress enacted Pub. L. No. 103-465 on December 8, 1994. The twenty-year
term took effect June 8, 1995. Id. § 534. The term of a patent that is in force on, or that
results from an application filed before, the date that is 6 months after the date of
enactment, shall be the greater of the twenty-year term or seventeen years from the grant
of patent. Id. § 532.
113. Bill Would Amend GA TT Legislation to Provide 17 or 20 Year Patent Term, Pat.
Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 20, 1995), available in LEXIS. Patent
Library, BNAPTD File.
114. H.R. 359 provides:
Section 1. Patent Terms.
(a) Amendment.-Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, Section 154
of Title 5, United States Code, as amended by the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, is amended-
(1) In paragraph (2) of subsection (A), by striking "and ending" and all that
follows in that paragraph and inserting "and ending-
(A) 17 years from the date of the grant of the patent, or
(B) 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was
filed in the United States, except that if the application contains a specific
.reference to an earlier filed application or applications under Section 120,
121, or 365(C) of this Title, 20 years from the date on which the earliest such
patent application was filed, whichever is later.";
(2) by amending subsection (B) to read as follows:
"(B) Patent Disclosure. - In the event that a continuing patent application is filed
that claims the benefit of the filing date of a prior application that was filed more
than 60 months earlier, notices of the original patent application and of the
continuing patent application shall be published and the public shall be permitted
to inspect and copy the original patent application and the continuing patent
application."; and
(3) in subsection (C)(1), by striking "shall be the greater of the 20-year term
as provided in subsection (A), or 17 years from grant" and inserting "shall be the
term provided in subsection (A)".
(B) Technical Amendment. - Section 534(B) of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act is amended by striking paragraph (3).
H.R. 359, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1995).
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the period of pendency and therefore by definition eliminate
submarine patents before the potential to disrupt entire industries
develops. Like eighteen-month mandatory publication, five-year
mandatory publication not only will limit the duration of secrecy
on intentionally delayed applications, but also will affect those that
are delayed through no fault of the applicant. Although it is
iniquitous to penalize an inventor who is making a genuine effort
to perfect a patent, this longer time period is not as severe a
disincentive to use the patent system.
Nevertheless, none of these solutions, including eighteen-
month publication, will remove the bulk of the submarine patents.
The bulk of the submarine patents remain secret due to national
security interests; the Patent Office would not publish these
applications under the Proposed Rules."'
2. Giving U.S. Inventors Access to Information Made Public in
Foreign Countries
Publishing applications at eighteen months would benefit U.S.
inventors by disclosing the applications of international filers.
Internationally filed applications are public information in foreign
countries but not in the United States. Under the present system,
foreign inventors have access to these new inventions before U.S.
inventors, providing them with a clear advantage.
16
Publishing applications at eighteen months would provide
U.S. inventors with access to a "comprehensive technological
database that foreign inventors receive in their own language from
their own Patent Offices.""' 7 Although U.S. inventors have
access to foreign Patent Offices and translators, small businesses
with limited resources are unlikely to be able to capitalize on this
information,118 This affects a significant amount of businesses
because "50% of all new inventions, and patents [developed in the
United States] are developed [by] ... small ... business."
'" 9
115. Proposed Rules, supra note 11, at 42,353.
116. 140 CONG. REC. S13,863 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1994) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
117. 140 CONG. REC. S1524, S1525 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1994) (statement of Sen.
DeConcini); see also Patent System Harmonization Act of'1992 Hearing, supra note 13. at
104 (statement of Robert B. Benson, Past President, American Intellectual Property Law
Association).
118. Ragusa, supra note 84, at 166.
119. Testimony January 18, 1995 John Satagaj Small Business Legislative Council House
Small Business Small Business/Tax Policy, Fed. Doc. Clearing House (Jan. 18, 1995),
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Furthermore, inventions by independent inventors and small
companies are not trivial. Over half of the sixty-one most
important innovations of the 20th century came from independent
inventors or small firms.12° Congress should seriously consider
providing these inventors the same access to information that
foreign inventors and select U.S. inventors enjoy. In addition to
benefitting small inventors by providing access to this information,
select U.S. inventors would benefit by eliminating the expense of
retrieving this information from abroad.
This argument presents a compelling reason for mandatory
disclosure of all applications. Other alternatives, however, are
available to achieve this same objective. One alternative to
mandatory publication would be for the U.S. government to
provide translations of public information from foreign Patent
Offices to inventors in the United States. In addition to giving
U.S. inventors access to information that, although secret in the
United States, is public information in foreign countries, these
translations would provide examiners with a more comprehensive
database with which to make patentability determinations.
This "sharing of information" was one aspect of the har-
monization talks.'21 The U.S., Japanese, and European Patent
Offices have agreed to exchange information by compact disc read-
only memory,'22 updating information monthly.'23
Another reason to institute government sponsored translations
rather than disclosure is that, with mandatory publication, the
United States would be doing more than simply giving U.S.
inventors access to information that their foreign counterparts
already enjoy. Due to the U.S. best mode requirement,"'2 a U.S.
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
120. U.S. DEP'T CoM., TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: ITS ENVIRONMENT AND
MANAGEMENT 16-17 (1967); see also 137 CONG. REc. H2755, H2759 (daily ed. May 2,
1991) (statement of Rep. Bentley).
121. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 12-13 (statement of Michael K.
Kirk, Assistant Commissioner for External Affairs, Patent and Trademark Office).
122. Agreement Reached on CD-ROM Distribution of Patent Info, Japan Economic
Newswire (Nov. 18, 1994), ayailable in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
123. See Intellectual Property, JPO's Patent Database Beats EU, U.S. in Sharing
Agreement, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A66 (Apr. 6, 1995).
124. The specification in an application for patent shall "set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1994). "The
purpose of the best mode requirement is to restrain inventors from applying for patents
while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments of their
inventions." Harmon, supra note 12, at 151.
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application discloses more information than applications in some
other countries. In Japan and Germany, patent laws do not
require the inventor to disclose the best mode to carry out his
invention.12  By publishing at eighteen months, the United
States actually could be disclosing additional information that is
not already public in other countries. Thus, providing translations
would allow applicants filing in countries that do not require best
mode disclosure to keep their best mode secret until the United
States grants a patent.
Yet another alternative exists if the United States is prepared
to change the underlying policy guideposts of its current patent
system'26 and make a concession using eighteen-month man-
datory publication as a bargaining chip. 27 The United States
could institute a two-track system of applications. This system
would allow domestic and international filers to file different
applications. The Patent Office would hold the application of an
applicant filing only a domestic application in secrecy until it issues
a patent. The Patent Office would mandatorily disclose after
eighteen months the U.S. applications of those who also file for a
foreign patent. By instituting this two-track system, the U.S.
Patent Office could provide information to U.S. inventors that is
public information in foreign countries but not in the United
States.
Unlike government provided translations, the two-track system
does not have the advantage of giving U.S. inventors access to all
applications filed in foreign countries. In addition, due to the best
mode requirement in the United States, a U.S. applicant still may
be revealing more information than will become public as a result
of foreign application publication. Nevertheless, it would give U.S.
inventors access to information that has become public information
in foreign countries due to foreign mandatory disclosure policies.
3. Mandatory Publication as a Bargaining Chip
The United States could use mandatory publication as a
bargaining chip to attain more meaningful changes in patent
125. Jerry R. Selinger, In Defense of "Best Mode": Preserving the Benefit of the Bargain
for the Public, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1072 n.6 (1994).
126. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying philosophy
of the U.S. patent system).
127. See infra part III.B.4.
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protection abroad."' These changes include: (1) faster patent
approval; (2) increased scope of patents and their interpretation by
courts; (3) elimination of pre-grant approval; (4) elimination of
compulsory licensing; and (5) the ability to file in English and
correct translation errors by referencing the original document.
29
The most serious problem for U.S. inventors filing in foreign
countries is the time required for an application to mature into a
patent. 3 ' A foreign inventor filing in the United States receives
his patent much sooner than a U.S. inventor filing abroad.
131
Delays create uncertainty as to what the ultimate scope of the
patent will be, thus affecting a potential patentee's ability to plan
for production and to bargain effectively in licensing
agreements.
32
Eliminating pre-grant opposition is one way to help reduce the
pendency period of patent applications abroad. Pre-grant
opposition "delays the patent grant and slows down informal or
formal enforcement since the application still lacks the official
government stamp of approval."'' 33  In addition, pre-grant op-
position "places a burden on the applicant because the opposer
can prepare his opposition over several years while the applicant
has only a few months to respond."'" Furthermore, "[p]atent
applications on major innovations . . . are often vigorously
challenged by large companies, which can afford a battery of
attorneys to pour over documents looking for weakness[es]. 135
Further criticism of pre-grant opposition under the Japanese
system points to its inherent bias against patent application
approval. In Japan, a patent examiner may receive many letters
128. See Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 32 (statement of Michael K.
Kirk, Assistant Commissioner for External Affairs, Patent and Trademark Office) (stating
that changes in Japanese patent laws will not occur without some changes also taking place
in U.S. patent laws.)
129. See, e.g., id. at 6 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Assistant Commissioner for
External Affairs, Patent and Trademark Office).
130. Id. at 54 (statement of Pacific Industrial Property Association).
131. See infra notes 189-92 and accompanying text. Japanese patent applications could
take as long as seven years. 139 CONG. REC. H7697 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1993) (statement
of Rep. Fish).
132. See Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of A.E. Hirsch,
Jr., Pacific Industrial Property Association).
133. Id. at 55.
134. Id. at 60 (statement of the Pacific Industrial Property Association).
135. Dana Rohrabacher, Keeping U.S. Patent Protections, J. COM., June 21, 1994, at A6,
reprinted in 140 CONG. REC. E1293 (daily ed. June 22, 1994).
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of opposition to an application. He then has the choice of either
responding to each and every letter after granting the patent, or
denying the patent application. 13 6 This creates a bias because the
latter choice requires much less work. Clearly, eliminating pre-
grant opposition would remove this bias and help reduce penden-
cies in the Japanese Patent Office.
The strength of protection a patent affords depends largely on
its scope. The broader the scope, the larger the number of
competing products and processes that will infringe the patent.
137
The United States especially desires increasing the scope of patents
and their interpretations in Japan. It is difficult to obtain a broad,
commercially viable patent in Japan.138  The Japanese system
instead encourages filing large numbers of applications on
inventions of limited scope.' In addition, Japanese courts
interpret patents very narrowly,4 ° essentially allowing companies
to copy inventions. 4'
Compulsory licensing is another problem U.S. inventors often
face abroad. As a condition of patent protection, some countries
require that the inventor license his invention to local industry or
even to other foreign enterprises at royalty rates that country has
determined.'42  This requirement puts inventors in a position of
having to compete with their licensee in the foreign market. This
affects market share and profits in the foreign country.
The ability to file in English and correct translation errors by
referencing the original application also would benefit U.S.
inventors. Problems with translation can affect the scope of the
136. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 46 (statement of the Pacific
Industrial Property Association).
137. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990).
138. International Trade Hearing, supra note 20, at 26 (statement of Dr. Allen I.
Mendelowitz).
139. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 54 (statement of Pacific Industrial
Property Association).
140. Leslie Helm, Chip Manufacturer is Denied Patent by Japanese Court; Computers:
Ruling that Fujitsu Chips Don't Infringe on Texas Instruments' Patent May Ignite Trade
Concerns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1994, at D2.
141. Id.; see also Intellectual Property, U.S. Complains about Japan's System for Patents
in Latest Round of Talks, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at Al10 (June 8, 1995),
[hereinafter Intellectual Prop. Talks].
142. Jobs Through Anti-Piracy, supra note 6, at 20 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman,
Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patents, Patent and Trademark Office,
Department of Commerce).
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patent. The European Patent Office 143  and, recently, the
Japanese Patent Office have instituted this revision procedure.
The Japanese Patent Office previously only allowed insertion of
foreign words, which could create translational ambiguities, into
the text of an application.'" One difficulty with this procedure
is that it required the applicant or translator to foresee where
possible ambiguities might exist before filing the application.
4 5
In addition, time constraints aggravated this task.
146
These problems create obstacles for U.S. inventors seeking
patents abroad. The United States, however, is not without means
to persuade other countries to change the unfair practices of their
patent systems. The United States can institute sanctions under
section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
1988. ' 7 A patent system that fails to provide adequate protec-
tion creates non-tariff barriers to free trade.'" Section 301 "is
designed to 'eliminate the acts, practices or policies of foreign
governments which adversely affect United States' exports.' ,,49
Section 301 operates as a unilateral mechanism to enforce the legal
rights of the United States.15  It enables the United States to
"increase tariffs to induce a country to improve its patent protec-
tion . '. . .',15' Although Congress has considered using this provi-
sion, 52 critics of this mechanism argue it is undesirable either
because of the high risk of retaliation or because of a belief that
143. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of A.E. Hirsch, Jr..
Pacific Industrial Property Association).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. The Paris onvention gives patent applicants a whole year to translate applications.
If applicants change their minds and decides to file in Japan with only a few months
remaining before a statutory bar, the time to prepare a translation is much shorter. Id.
147. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2411-2420
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
148. Nancy J. Linck & John E. McGarry, Patent Procurement and Enforcement in
Japan-A Trade Barrier, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 411 (1993).
149. Marjorie A. Minkler, Note, The Omnibus Trade Act of 1988, Section 301: A
Permissible Enforcement Mechanism or a Violation of the United States' Obligations Under
International Law?, 11 U. PI'r. J.L. & CoM. 283 (1992) (quoting Shirley A. Coffield, Using
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Government Trade Actions:
When, Why and How, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 381 (1981)).
150. See id.
151. Jobs Through Anti-Piracy, supra note 6, at 47 (prepared statement of Ira S.
Shapiro, General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative).
152. See International Trade Hearing, supra note 20, at 20 (statement of Sen.
Rockefeller).
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the dispute settlement mechanism adopted in the Uruguay Round
Agreement precludes its use.153
The Uruguay Round Agreement, however, does not preclude
the use of section 301.154 In addition, "[t]his action can be
undertaken without threat of counter-retaliation" because the
Uruguay Round Agreement provides for the possibility of dispute
settlement and cross-retaliation for failure to meet obligations
under that Agreement. 5 5 "The Special 301 provision of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which calls for
identifying and seeking improvements for inadequate protection by
our trading partners, is an important addition to the tools available
for achieving the goal of improved intellectual property protec-
tion.",I%
H.R. 1733 is the result of an agreement, concluded under the
framework of Special 301, 57 between U.S. Commerce Secretary
Ron Brown and Japanese Ambassador Takakazu Kuriyama. It is
the second of two agreements.'58 With this second agreement,
"[w]e're getting provisions we've been seeking a long time."' 5 9
According to some, "[t]his will have a big market-opening ef-
fect.
, 160
The first agreement called for Japan to permit filing of patent
applications in English by July 1, 1995, and to allow for correction
of translation errors during examination and after grant. In return,
the United States agreed to introduce legislation to provide a
twenty-year U.S. patent term, measured from the earliest non-
153. Jobs Through Anti-Piracy, supra note 6, at 46-47 (prepared 9tatement of Ira S.
Shapiro, General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative).
154. Id. at 47.
155. Id. at 46-47.
156. Id. at 61-62 (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
157. USTR Announcement on Foreign Government Procurement (Title VII) and
Intellectual Property Protection (Special 301) Executive Office of the President Office of the
United States Trade Representative Washington, D. C. 20506,12 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No.
18, at 791 (May 3, 1995), available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter
USTR Announcement].
158. Patents, House Panel Hears Debate on Whether Reforms will Help or Hurt Patent
Holders, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A214 (Nov. 6, 1995)[hereinafter House
Panel Hears Debate].
159. Riordan, supra note 8, at D1 (statement of Bruce Lehman, Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks).
160. Id.
[Vol. 18:143
Mandatory Publication
provisional U.S. filing date.'6' Congress introduced this legis-
lation in May 1994 and enacted it in December 1994.162 As of
July 1995, Japanese law permits English at the Japanese Patent
Office.
163
Under the second agreement, Japan agreed to end third party
pre-grant opposition by April 1, 1995, and to establish an optional
thirty-six month accelerated examination procedure by January
1996.' 6  In return, the U.S. Patent Office agreed to publish
applications within eighteen months from the earliest filing date,
and to allow expanded opportunities for third party objections in
re-examination proceedings. 165  Japan also agreed to stop awar-
ding "dependent patent compulsory licenses," beginning July 1,
1995.'66
This year, the United States again placed Japan on a "priority
watch list" under the provisions of Special 301 for its narrow scope
and interpretations of claims. 67 Nevertheless, the United States
and Japan have not reached any conclusive agreements over this
issue."6  "This practice has severely limited the ability of U.S.
patent holders ... to acquire exclusive rights comparable to those
available to Japanese patent holders in the United States.'
'1 69
Although changes in the Japanese Patent Office would bring
gains to U.S. applicants filing there, the United States should not
obtain these changes by debasing U.S. patent law. "Patents are,
and have been the engine of our technological leadership.'
170
The United States is a world leader in the number of influential
patents it has issued.'' In 1993, it issued almost twice as many
161. House Panel Hears Debate, supra note 158.
162. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, supra note 112.
163. Intellectual Prop. Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 45 (statement of Rep.
Moorhead).
164. U.S., Japan Sign Patents Accord, AFX News, Aug. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Non-US File [hereinafter Patents Accord].
165. Id.; see also Riordan, supra note 8, at D1.
166. Laurent Belsie, US, Japan Patent Laws Move Closer, Easing Filing Challenges,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 18, 1994, at 8. "Though rarely used today, in the past
these measures have forced US inventors to license their technology to a Japanese
competitor for a set amount of compensation." Id.
167. USTR Announcement, supra note 157.
168. Mark Magnier, US, Japan End Patent Talks with Progress, But No Pacts, J. COM.,
June 8, 1995, at A3.
169. USTR Announcement, supra note 157.
170. 138 CONG. REC. H7370 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement of Rep. Bentley).
171. Id. at H7371.
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as Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. 172
Based on this fact, the United States should not rush to give up its
system in favor of a system that is producing far fewer influential
patents.173  The United States should not, in an effort to remedy
unfair trade practices, stray from the underlying policy that brings
it prosperity.
4. Limited Impact to United States Applicants
Another argument that supports eighteen-month mandatory
publication is that it would have a limited impact on U.S. ap-
plicants because the average pendency of a U.S. patent is nineteen-
months.'74  This figure, however, can be misleading because it
understates reality by including "follow-on" applications., 75  It
may not take into, account the filing date of the original applica-
tion.
71
For example, consider a patent application that was originally
filed in 1980. Continuing applications are filed in 1982, and
1984, and then the patent issues in 1986. The Patent Office
counts the 1982 and 1984 refilings as two different applications.
Thus a process that took effectively six years is counted as three
applications averaging two years each. 77
This can lead to higher pendencies on the more significant
patents not being included in the statistics. Patents involved in
litigation, which are arguably more significant, have a higher total
pendency. The total pendency, as measured from the earliest U.S.
172. Helen Delich-Bentley, Patent System at Risk, Cong. Press Releases (Aug. 11, 1994).
"In 1993 the United States led the world in influential patents with 59,588 ... ." Id.
173. 138 CONG. REC. H7371 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1992) (statement 6f Rep. Bentley). The
United States has produced 104,541 influential patents. Japan has produced 76,984
influential patents. Germany, France, Belgium, Sweden, Great Britain, Canada, Italy,
Switzerland, the Netherlands, U.S.S.R., South Korea, and Taiwan together have produced
50,365 influential patents. Id.
174. Prepared Testimony of Paul B. Crilly, Ph.D. University of Tennessee Knoxville
Before the House Committee on Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property
Re: H.R. 359, or Why Not a Guaranteed Patent Term, Fed. Info. Sys., Nov. 1, 1995,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File [hereinafter Crilly Testimony] (stating
that PTO Commissioner Bruce Lehman testified that the average pendency was nineteen
months).
175. Banner & Kaltenheuser, supra note 107.
176. Crilly Testimony, supra note 174.
177. Id.
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filing date, is thirty-six months. 7 ' .Furthermore, certain in-
dustries could be disproportionately affected. For example, longer
pendencies typically occur in genetics. 79 In this and other areas
where inventors are breaking new ground, the Patent Office
requires extra time to review a patent application.' °
Where inventors are breaking new ground, "the inventor must
file broad claims in order to stake out what he has achieved."'
' 81
Because the applicant must find an examiner who can understand
a technology that she or he has not previously seen, "such broad
claims are frequently contested at length before allowance is
given.'
' 82
Although publication at eighteen months would not affect
some applicants, the potential to affect all applicants exists.
Therefore, even though publication at eighteen months statistically
gives the impression of limited impact, every applicant must
consider the risk that his or her individual application may take
longer than eighteen months. Each applicant also must consider
the risk of ultimately having to withdraw their application, in order
to preserve a trade secret, 83 in light of the cost of securing a
178. Miller, supra note 105, at 730. Those patents the U.S. district courts reported to
the Patent and Trademark Office during the six weeks prior to October 1991 served as the
measurement for the average gross pendency. Id.
179. See 139 CONG. REC. S1789, S1795 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1993) (statement of Edmund
L. Andrews).
So far, the gene patents have moved much more slowly than applications for
other types of inventions. While the average application now takes 18 months
to reach a final decision, the three mice patents that were issued Dec. 29[, 1992]
had all been pending for about four years.
Patent Office officials said they did not impose a formal moratorium on.
transgenic animals. "These things just take a long time to work through," Oscar
Mastin, a spokesman for the agency, said. "They have been working on these
applications the whole time."
Id.
180. See generally Patent and Trademark Office Issues First Animal Patent, 35 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No.- 876, at 508 (April 14, 1988) (Donald J. Quigg,
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, acknowledging the long pendency period of
three to four years for non-naturally occurring non-human multicellular living organisms
subject matter, noting that the PTO has had difficulty recruiting examiners in this new area
of science).
181. Hill Testimony, supra note 68.
182. Id.
183. See supra part III.A.1.
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patent."8 This uncertainty could diminish the incentive to seek
patent protection.
In addition, small businesses strongly oppose the move toward
mandatory publication.8 ' Small inventors fear that this change
will affect them negatively."8 If the change truly would have a
limited impact on U.S. inventors, small businesses and other
similarly situated sectors would not be strenuously opposed to
mandatory publication.87
5. Conformity with the Rest of the World
Proponents for eighteen-month mandatory publication argue
the need for conformity with the rest of the world as a reason for
change.188 Almost all major countries publish applications at
eighteen months. In those countries, however, mandatory
publication at eighteen months may be a necessary mechanism to
provide inventors with stimulating ideas.
Delays are more the rule than the exception around the
globe.'89 For example, in the European Patent Office, obtaining
an electronics patent takes five to six years and a biotechnology
patent takes four years." In Switzerland, obtaining a patent can
take six years 9' and in Japan the average pendency for a patent
is six to seven years." Under these circumstances, publication
184. Patent applications range from $2,500 to $50,000. Vito J. DeBari, International
Harmonization of Patent Law: A Proposed Solution to the United States' First-to-File
Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 687, 703 n.136 (1993) (quoting Ned L. Conley,
First-To-Invent: A Superior System For the United States, 22 ST, MARY'S L.J. 779, 783
(1991)). Even the courts have noted that "[p]atent applications are expensive." Paulik
v. Ritzkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Markey, C.J., concurring).
185. The management of the National Manufacturers Association proposed the Patent
Harmonization Act of 1992. Patent System Harmonization Act, supra note 13.
186. See supra part III.A.2.
187. See generally 140 CONG. REC. H9879 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Bently claiming first hand knowledge that American small business inventors will shut
down this change); see also Patent Harmonization Proposal Stirs Lively Debate at PTO
Hearing, 46 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 1150, at 508 (Oct. 14, 1993)
(witnesses from the small-inventor community voiced outright opposition to the publication
proposal).
188. See, e.g., Ragusa, supra note 84, at 167-68.
189. Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 74 (testimony of Karl F. Jorda,
Corporate Counsel, CIBA-GEIGY Corporation).
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. International Trade Hearing, supra note 20, at 26 (statement of Dr. Allen I.
Mendelowitz).
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of the application at eighteen months might be the only way to
disclose information to the public in a timely fashion. Because the
United States has lower pendency periods, the requirement for
publication is not imperative.
Additionally, other countries may have other procedural or
policy reasons for the mandatory eighteen-month publication.
Japan is one such example. Long pendency periods due to
deferred examination, 93 coupled with mandatory disclosure,
allow the Japanese Patent Office to reduce its workload by
eliminating applications to which it should not grant a patent.1
4
This was accomplished by allowing pre-grant opposition in con-
junction with publication.95 The Japanese Patent Office has a
growing backlog of applications."6  Although the Japanese
Patent Office has added more patent examiners in the past years,
the small increase in the number of examiners has been insufficient
to lower the average pendency.97 Therefore, mandatory disclo-
sure may be necessary in a system with insufficient staff to help
"flush out" applications to which it should not grant a patent. In
contrast, the United States has an adequate number of examiners
to perform this function. 98
193. Under the Japanese system, the Patent Office can defer examination of the
application until the applicant iequests. See Jeffrey A. Wolfson, Patent Flooding in the
Japanese Patent Office: Methods for Reducing Patent Flooding and Obtaining Effective
Patent Protection, 27 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 531, 544 (1993).
194. See Japanese Patent Policy Hearing, supra note 6, at 65 (statement of Alan D.
Lourie, Vice President, Corporate Patents & Trademarks, SmithKline Beckman
Corporation).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 23 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Assistant Commissioner for External
Affairs, Patent and Trademark Office).
197. See generally id. at 29 (statement of Michael K. Kirk, Assistant Commissioner for
External Affairs, Patent and Trademark Office) (contrasting the effort by the Japanese
Patent Office with the much larger addition of examiners by the United States Patent
Office).
198. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The United States should not implement eighteen-month
mandatory disclosure. The U.S. patent system has made the
United States a great country and is critical to maintaining U.S.
industrial strength.1" The United States should not abandon the
underlying policy values that facilitated its economic growth.
Mandatory publication at eighteen months will discourage use of
the patent system. Protection of trade secrets and the incentive to
use the U.S. patent system should continue as they exist under
current law.
Rather than an eighteen-month mandatory publication policy,
the United States should give inventors access to information that
is public in foreign countries. To achieve this, the U.S.
government should provide translations of foreign patent ap-
plications to inventors. If the United States needs a change in
policy to serve as a bargaining chip in international negotiations,
it should instead implement a two-track patent application method
and publish only those U.S. applications that inventors also file
abroad. This method would allow all U.S. inventors access to
information contained in internationally filed applications while
maintaining trade secrets for solely domestic applications. Using
mandatory publication as a bargaining chip, however, is unwise in
light of the cost to independent inventors, small companies, and
the long range competitiveness of the United States.
The recent changes in patent terms have mitigated the threat
of improperly motivated submarine patents, which already was
insignificant. The United States should not seek international
conformity at the expense of reducing the strength of the U.S.
patent system. Although mandatory publication would not affect
199. 140 CONG. REC. H7967 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1994) (statement of Rep. Bently).
In the early 1900's the government of Japan wanted to determine what made
the United States such an industrial power. A team of investigators was
dispatched to determine why America was so successful and the team concluded
it was the patent system.
The official report stated:
"We looked about us to see what nations are the greatest, so that we can be
like them . . . . We said, what is it that makes the United States such a great
Nation? We investigated and found that it was patents, and we will have
patents."
In the early 1980's Japan again determined the patent system was critical to
America's industrial strength.
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inventors who receive their patents prior to eighteen months, its
potential to affect each applicant creates an uncertainty that
reduces the incentive to seek patent protection.
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